In the mid-1990s, a Social Democratic government pursued an ambitious fiscal austerity policy in Sweden in the aftermath of a deep recession and public budget crisis. Economic advisors were guided by the idea that fiscal austerity would have neutral or expansionary effects on output and employment. In order to avoid large public deficits in the future the government also introduced radical fiscal rules. The main conclusion in this article is that the fiscal austerity measures in the mid-1990s delayed the Swedish economic recovery and that neither these measures nor the fiscal rules were responsible for the impressive Swedish macroeconomic performance in the following period. The positive economic development in Sweden was driven by export, profit and technology, reflecting an international upswing and the country's flexible exchange rates and industrial composition. Similar beneficial conditions for expansion are not present in the EMU countries suffering from a budget and debt crisis today.
Introduction
The EU commission, IMF, ECB and Germany have hitherto recommended the EMU countries severely hit by a public debt crisis to expand by fiscal austerity. Advocates of the policy refer to sound economic theories and the prevalence of good examples. One influential argument for fiscal restraint is based on Swedish experiences. During the first half of the 1990s Sweden suffered a deep recession and financial crisis leading to mass unemployment and a large public budget deficit. In the middle of the decade a Social Democratic government pursued a very restrictive fiscal policy. During the second half of the 1990s the government also introduced strict fiscal policy rules. The conventional view, both in Sweden and abroad, is that the tight fiscal policy in the mid-1990s and the domestic fiscal rules constituted a success story. The This article maintains, however, that fiscal austerity in the mid-1990s actually delayed the Swedish recovery and that neither this policy nor the fiscal rules were major factors in Sweden's good growth performance by Sweden in the subsequent years. The country's economic development up until the global financial crisis was driven mainly by export, profit and technology reflecting an international recovery and favourable exchange-rate and industry-structural conditions. Moreover, as a result of the rapid recovery of the Baltic countries, Sweden was lucky enough to escape a bank crisis [2008] [2009] . Two of the four leading banks in Sweden were heavily exposed to the Baltic countries. But the focus in this article is on the relationship between fiscal restraint and Sweden's economic development since the mid-1990s, thus not exclusively on the country's economic policy and performance during the global financial and debt crisis.
The article is primarily a case study of Sweden including some regression analysis. But it also uses a qualitative comparative approach comparing Sweden's fiscal policy and macroeconomic performance to that of other OECD countries, especially other small open Western European countries (Norway, Finland, Denmark, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland). The conclusions are buttressed by findings from earlier inquiries. Before scrutinizing the short and long run real effects of Swedish fiscal restraint, the article describes the background to the Swedish austerity policy and fiscal rules in the 1990s, the scope of these fiscal measures and rules in an international perspective, and the underpinning economic theories.
The introduction of a new economic-policy regime
In the 1980s, an international boom, two devaluations of the Swedish crown (SEK) and an abandonment of the restrictions on bank lending in combination with a tax system favouring borrowing resulted in serious overheating and (relatively) high inflation in Sweden. Fueled by the development of new financial instruments and institutions an economic bubble appeared, especially in stocks and commercial real estate. The early 1990s saw a collapse of the stock, housing and commercial real-estate markets in Sweden. In consequence, there was a bank crisis and an exceptional decline in private consumption and investment. The depression was largely domestic and no other OECD country than Finland experienced a comparable crisis at that time. Swedish GDP fell in absolute terms three years in a row. The decline in Swedish GDP growth and employment between 1991-1993 was actually larger than that during the Great Depression of the 1930s (Edvinsson 2005, Table 9 .7 and 9.12). Unemployment shot up from 1.5 per cent in 1990 to above 9 per cent in 1993-1994. Speculative attacks against the SEK in the early 1990s also led to the collapse of the fixed exchange-rate system in November 1992. Table 27 and 32).
The growing public budget deficit in Sweden during the first half of the 1990s was the result of a combination of built-in stabilizers and expansionary fiscal policies, inter alia, through extraordinary bank subsidies.
1 A non-socialist coalition minority government in 1991-1994 had the ambition, but not the internal cohesion and time, to implement a radical programme for fiscal consolidation. The programme was mainly carried out by the Social Democratic minority government installed in October 1994. The restrictive fiscal policy of the mid-1990s, when the rate of unemployment was still high, was a clear break with the Swedish economic policy embraced in the early 1930s. At the initiative of leading Social Democrats and economists belonging to the so-called Stockholm School of Economics Keynesian ideas of active countercyclical economic policy were adopted already in the early 1930s in Sweden.
The restrictive fiscal policy in Sweden in the mid-1990s was made possible for several reasons. Firstly, the trauma of the economic crisis at the beginning of the decade had an equal impact on people of all ages, genders and in all sectors. This allowed a consensus to emerge on the damaging effects of inflation and the policy response was accepted even by the central trade-union organizations. Secondly, new economic thinking was emerging, stating that unemployment rates of 1.5 per cent were unsustainable and that a reduction in unemployment could only be made through product market deregulation and measures promoting flexibility in the labour market. Thirdly, in the 1980s and 1990s, economic experts governed by new economic thinking extended their influence over Swedish economic policy and the blue-collar trade union confederation, LO, had a correspondingly decreasing impact.
However, it is difficult to infer whether the fiscal austerity measures in the mid-1990s were initiated by the leading politicians or by professional economists within the Ministry of Finance (Erixon 2011, pp. 294-299) . Fourthly, EU integration played a role in making fiscal austerity possible due to the Maastricht convergence rules prohibiting a large public budget deficit and debt (the 3 per cent GDP deficit rule and the 60 per cent GDP debt rule). After a (close) referendum in 1994 Sweden entered the EU the following year.
The four above-mentioned factors were also decisive for the introduction of fiscal and monetary targets and other changes in the economic-policy regime in Sweden in the 1990s
1 The OECD measure of government cyclically-adjusted balances gives a larger prominence to lax fiscal policies than to built-in-stabilizers when the growing Swedish budget deficit 1991-1993 is to be explained (see Economic Outlook 2007, no 2, Table 27 and 28). But the OECD estimates probably exaggerate the importance of discretionary fiscal measures for the Swedish public-budget crisis and probably also for the following public budget consolidation. not reflect an easing of fiscal rules. Rather, it was a consequence of EU regulation requiring that some parts of the pension system should be included in the private sector. Finally, the Social Democrats in 1997 decided to restrict the extent to which local and county governments could pass budgets without a deficit. The new law, introduced in 2000, stated that these governments must eliminate budget deficits within two years.
Swedish fiscal restraint in a comparative perspective
The large Swedish public-budget deficit in 1993 vanished rapidly in the following years to be completely eliminated in 1998. And from 1995 to 2000, the gross public debt as a ratio of 1994 -1998 (Henriksson 2012 . In fact an ambitious fiscal 2 Estimates of the contribution of fiscal policy to the public budget balance in Sweden are only available for the postwar period, see Matthiessen (1971) and Braconier and Holden (1999) . austerity programme had already been launched by the non-socialist government at the beginning of 1994.
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Swedish fiscal restraint in the mid-1990s was also exceptional from an international perspective. The OECD secretariat regularly presents data on the cyclically-adjusted public budget balance in member countries. (Girouard and André 2005) . We can, rather confidently, draw the conclusion that the public budget consolidation policy in Sweden in the 1990s was radical from an international perspective.
The multidimensional character of the fiscal rules, but also the variation in obedience, makes it difficult to compare the actual strictness of fiscal rules in different OECD countries (see OECD 2002, pp. 132-134; CESifo 2012; Barnes, Davidsson and Rawdanowics 2012) . The rigour of the fiscal rules can be assessed in terms of whether they are explicit numerical targets, cover public expenditure or public budget balances or both, define the public debt or public deficit or both, make exceptions for some budget items, are only binding in the short, 2, Table 28 ). Moreover, the improvement in the budget balance (or the reductions in the real interest rate and increase in economic growth) was not the most important explanation for the dramatic decline in Swedish public debt. Primary surpluses (determined also by built-in stabilizers) explained only 36 per cent (30 per cent) of the decline in net public debt 1997-2007 (1997-2011) . The reevaluation of debts and assets was by far the most important factor behind the decline in Swedish public debt (Flodén 2012) . The contribution of the primary surpluses to the reduction in net public debt was actually larger in absolute terms in Denmark, Belgium, Canada and Italy. Thus, the conclusion in the empirical literature that the new fiscal-policy arrangements in Sweden were exceptionally successful in reducing public deficits and debts (see Miyazaki 2011) must be qualified.
The theory of expansion through fiscal restraint
The survey of the economic literature focuses on the argument at the time of the budget consolidation policy in Sweden, that restrictive fiscal austerity has neutral or even expansionary effects on GDP and employment. This section also highlights the arguments by advisors to the Swedish Minister of Finance in the mid-1990s that the restrictive fiscal policy at that time had neutral or expansionary effects. The advisors formulated these arguments during the years of budget consolidation or ex post. The section will also address the argument in the economic literature that fiscal rules have positive macroeconomic effects.
The Ricardian equivalence presupposes that the negative impact of fiscal restraint on output and employment will be offset by a rise in the private saving propensity. Economic experts in the Ministry of Finance referred to the Ricardian equivalence when maintaining ex post that fiscal austerity in the mid-1990s had contributed to macroeconomic stability in Sweden. They stressed that higher household savings through fiscal austerity had reduced the public budget deficit caused by built-in stabilizers (Ministry of Finance 2000, p. 23). Francesco
Giavazzi and Marco Pagano had claimed already in the early 1990s, by reference to Denmark and Ireland, that fiscal austerity might even be expansionary. Cuts in public expenditure today result in household expectations that taxes will be reduced in the future. The pertinent stimuli of private consumption (through the positive wealth effects) can be decisive for the current macroeconomic activity level (Giavazzi and Pagano 1990) . In another contemporary theory of expansion through fiscal austerity, private consumption and investment can be enhanced by reductions in the interest rate. Rational agents anticipate that fiscal austerity will reduce the long-term (real) interest rate. The related increase in private consumption and investment may be decisive for aggregate demand, thus, fiscal restraint may have a positive effect on short-run GDP and employment (Blanchard 1991) . This theory became a crucial part of the new consensus in macroeconomics in the 1990s.
When arguing in the middle of the 1990s that fiscal restraint is expansionary, Swedish suggested, primarily by reference to Dixit and Lambertini (2000) and (2003), that fiscal contraction in Sweden in the mid-1990s stimulated the Swedish economy by eliciting an easier monetary policy. This argument for a relation between fiscal and monetary policy was an ex post rationale for the front loading feature of the restrictive fiscal policy in Sweden in the mid1990s -in order to create creditability, extensive austerity programmes were already launched at the beginning of the consolidation period (Henriksson 2012) . According to the underpinning economic theory, a commitment to fiscal restraint is a signal to the Central Bank that it can pursue a more expansionary monetary policy. Lower interest rates will, inter alia, weaken the currency and thus have a positive effect on net export. Paradoxically the Swedish Ministry of Finance had had hopes at the beginning of the budget consolidation period that the SEK would be strengthened by restrictive fiscal policy (see Henriksson 2012, p. 2) . The Ministry probably assumed the policy would reduce expected inflation and therefore expectations of a depreciation of the SEK leading to a decline in long-term interest rates (see the interest parity condition). Thus, fiscal contractionism was supposed to have a negative impact on the interest rates in Sweden irrespective of the effects on expected and actual (domestic) monetary policy. 4 An obvious weakness of an economic-policy strategy based on the idea of expansion through fiscal austerity is that the direct deflationary effect of tax increases and reductions in public expenditure might be decisive for GDP and employment in the short run, and further that the decrease in GDP and increase in unemployment might actually reduce confidence among households and firms. Furthermore, a reduction in the nominal interest rate is not necessarily connected to a reduction in the real rates. When arguing, in the mid-1990s, for that fiscal austerity would stimulate private consumption and investment, economic advisors to the Swedish Minister of Finance focused on the nominal interest rates. Economists forming the new macroeconomic consensus (the new neoclassical synthesis) admitted that the effects of fiscal restraint not only on GDP and employment but also on the real interest rate are theoretically ambiguous (Blanchard 1991, pp. 375-377) . There was obvious inconsistency between the arguments by the defenders of Swedish fiscal austerity in the mid-1990s that the policy would make a large contribution to the reduction of inflation expectations and simultaneously be expansionary. The more efficient the fiscal austerity policy was in reducing expected inflation, the higher was the risk that this policy would increase the real interest rates.
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The main arguments in the economic literature for fiscal rules is that they will prevent governments from running public budget deficits and, by limiting the space for discretionary Moreover, after having widened in 1994-1995, the gap between long-term interest rates in Sweden and Germany decreased in 1995-1996 (see the comparison of 10 year bonds in Figure   2 ). In year 2000 the German-Swedish divergence in bond yields had actually disappeared. The dramatic reduction in Swedish household saving 1994-1998 seems to be a strong case for the Ricardian equivalence. But it is extremely difficult to separate the effects of the public budget consolidation and the business-cycle upswing (by other factors). Furthermore, the development towards lower interest rates and inflation expectations in Sweden had begun already during the deep recession in the early 1990s. In fact, Swedish interest rates started to converge with the German rates immediately after the exchange-rate turmoil in Autumn 1992, that is, in a period of increasing public deficits. The growing long-term interest gap between Sweden and Germany in 1994-1995 arose through expectations of an increase in the Riksbank's prime rate, thus it was not directly related to Sweden's public budget deficit. And these expectations were primarily based on the depreciation of the SEK which had led to higher import prices and also to unstable labour markets with overly high nominal wage increases, which is to be expected after a strong depreciation. In the first year with flexible exchange rates (1993), the SEK was depreciated by 25 per cent against the currencies of competing countries, a weakening of the SEK similar to that after the Swedish devaluations in the early 1980s. This explanation for the larger differentials in interest rates in [1994] [1995] between Sweden and Germany is corroborated by the fact that Finland had a similar development in interest rates as Sweden (see Figure 3) . Finland had followed the same pattern of financial deregulation and overheating in the 1980s and financial crisis in the early 1990s as Sweden. Moreover, both countries switched to flexible exchange rates in Autumn 1992
(Finland two months earlier than Sweden) and experienced a similar dramatic fall in the value of the currency the following year. But Finnish governments had already undertaken fiscal austerity measures in the early 1990s, thus not as Sweden in the period when the long-term interest gap to Germany started to grow in both countries. Source: The Riksbank.
Swedish monetary policy was actually tightened in 1994-1995. The ambition of the Riksbank was to combat the inflation tendencies in the wake of the Swedish export-led recovery, and 7 The increase on yields on 10-year bonds 1994 was somewhat stronger in Sweden than in Finland (see Figure 3 ). This difference primarily reflected lower expected wage inflation in Finland, inter alia, reflecting the higher unemployment rate and the stronger coordination of industrial wage negotiations that year. Furthermore, actors on financial markets were probably uncertain about Swedish wage formation in the aftermath of the Rehnberg commission -an extraordinary tripartite incomes-policy arrangement in 1990-1992. particularly to mitigate the inflation pressure after the weakening of the SEK (the Riksbank 1994 (the Riksbank , pp. 7-8, 1995 . Thus, neither the previous increase in long-term yields on Swedish bonds nor the restrictive monetary policy 1994-1995 revealed a growing mistrust of the ability of Swedish governments to accomplish a public budget consolidation.
Similarly, the decreasing gap in long-term interest rates between Sweden and Germany in 1995-1996 was not caused by the ongoing fiscal austerity policy, but by expectations of a decrease in the Riksbank's prime rate. And these expectations were not directly formed by fiscal policy but by the suspicion among speculators (later confirmed) that the SEK would be strengthened in 1995 by a restrictive monetary policy (and improvements in the Swedish trade balance) mitigating the threat to the Riksbank's inflation target.
What more is, the decreasing yields on Swedish Treasury Bills and government bonds, more than half a year before the switch to a laxer monetary policy in January 1996, cast doubt on the hypothesis that the falling interest rates in Sweden reflected a nexus between frontloaded fiscal restraint and expansionary monetary policy (cf. Henriksson 2012) . The reduction in the Riksbank's prime rate (the repo rate) in 1996 was primarily a consequence of weaker inflation pressure through the strengthening of the SEK (from mid-1995 until late 1996) and also through unexpected productivity increases in the Swedish economy (in the early 1996). 8 The steady slackening of monetary policy during the second half of the 1990s, notwithstanding a strong recovery of the Swedish economy, reflected a conspicuous productivity development (see next section) and a restrictive monetary policy in the past.
Monetary restraint in the first half of the 1990s had succeeded, together with the economic crisis, in bringing down expected inflation and in establishing general confidence in the newly introduced inflation target.
Furthermore it is difficult to relate the convergence of Swedish and German long-term interest rates during the second half of the 1990s, and particularly the almost parallel development in these rates since the end of 1996, to Swedish economic policy in any which way. In fact, during the second half of the 1990s, there was a general convergence of longterm interest rates among the OECD countries. Thus, falling interest-rate differentials vis-à-vis including the budget consolidation policy.
There was indeed a recovery of private investment and consumption in Sweden during the years of fiscal austerity. But the Swedish recovery was not consumption or even investment driven. The increase in private consumption in the mid-1990s was similar to that in the upcoming Euro countries (on average) (see the first column in Table A , Appendix 1). And this increase was actually weaker in Sweden than in the small open Western European countries and the OECD on average. Furthermore, the Swedish recovery in total investment in the mid-1990s was modest from an international perspective (see column two and three in Table A , appendix 1). There was a significant increase in private investment in the country, excluding residential investment (see column three). But the sharpest increase in these investments had already occurred in 1994-1995. Both nominal and real interest rates on Swedish Treasury bills and government bonds did actually increase during the second half of 1994 and the first half of 1995 (see Figure 1 ).
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Swedish investments in the mid-1990s were mainly induced by higher exports, reflecting an international recovery and a profit increase in manufacturing due to the depreciation of the SEK (see next section). 10 The profit share of value added in manufacturing reached a record level for the postwar period in the mid-1990s. Swedish depreciations largely explain why export growth and the share of the trade balance in GDP growth was higher in Sweden in the middle of the 1990s than in other OECD countries with the exception of Ireland and South Korea (see column one and three in Table B , appendix 1).
Thus, in the mid-1990s, fiscal austerity contributed strongly to budget consolidation, but not to the recovery of the Swedish economy. On the contrary, the restrictive fiscal (and monetary) policy at that time had contractionary effects, thus causing a delay in the Swedish 9 What more is, there was an increase in both nominal and real interest rates in Sweden in 1997, thus in the period of budget consolidation. It is difficult, however, to attribute this increase to Swedish fiscal policies.
10 In 1994-1995, the manufacturing sector's share of the increase in total investments at constant prices was between 68 and 79 per cent (depending on the choice of reference year). The corresponding shares were 46 and 51 per cent between 1994 and 1998. These shares were disproportionally high considering that the manufacturing sector's share of value added (constant prices) was between 17-20 per cent at the time (National Accounts of OECD Countries II, 2002 and 2005, table 10 ).
recovery after the deep economic recession of the early 1990s. Domestic-demand growth in Sweden was low from an international perspective (see column four in Table A , Appendix 1).
Notwithstanding favourable circumstances such as a weaker SEK (1993 SEK ( -1995 , an international recovery and a high potential for Solowian growth (see the absolute reduction in GDP in the early 1990s) Sweden experienced lower GDP growth than the OECD average 1996-1997 (see Table C Table 14 ). Undoubtedly fiscal policy contributed substantially, albeit together with the stronger SEK (hampering export in 1996), to the Swedish economic backlash of the mid-1990s. Swedish fiscal austerity was definitely a success story from a cameral, although not from a stabilization policy, viewpoint.
The real effects of fiscal austerity in the long run
The initial fiscal austerity policy during a fragile recovery and the new institutions of economic policy (fiscal rules, inflation targeting, new budget procedures and central-bank independence) legitimate references to a new economic-policy regime in Sweden from the mid-1990s. The new regime seems to have been successful in terms of GDP growth, particularly in 1998 GDP growth, particularly in -2007 (see Table C in Appendix 1). For example, despite Sweden's specialization in tele-products, the recession after the ICT crash in the early 2000s became mild and short-lived as in other OECD countries. However, the beneficial GDP development in Sweden since the mid-1990s was export, profit and technology led, and therefore not the result of fiscal austerity in the mid1990s or the contemporary and subsequent fiscal reforms.
There is scant evidence that the fiscal rules increased Swedish GDP growth by producing a reduction in economic volatility. The radical rules, yet providing a room for countercyclical policy, seem to have created very favourable conditions for macroeconomic stability in 18 15 The results are almost identical for periods excluding the current financial crisis and for manufacturing. However, in 1995 However, in -2007 , productivity shocks were less important for investment in the business sector, although not for investment in manufacturing. Besides, there were no indications at all of a negative relationship between nominal interest rates and investment in this period. Surprisingly, the regression analysis could not distinguish any independent role for the exchange rate (the coefficients had low t-values and unexpected signs).
16 Granger causality tests envisage that the changes in the Swedish nominal bond rates in 1995-2013 and 1995-2007 had the expected effects on the SEK with a delay of one to three quarters. 17 All Johansen tests in the study were based on log-transformed quarterly level data. The tests were consistently preceded by a Dickey-Fuller test of unit roots confirming the necessary requirement that variables are non-stationary at levels and stationary in first differences. Investment and inflation data were obtained from Statistics Sweden, nominal interest-rate data from the Riksbank and data on expected inflation from the National Institute of Economic Research (Konjunkturinstitutet).
18 However it cannot be excluded that the fiscal rules played an independent role by having prolonged the collective memory of the Swedish public budget crisis (see Flodén 2012, p. 20) .
challenged by the fact that Sweden has not been successful in all respects since the mid-1990s.
The labour force participation rate never returned to the high levels prior to the deep recession in the early 1990s although Sweden still belongs to the group of OECD countries with the highest rates. Furthermore, the strict rules for fiscal policy and ultimately for monetary policy (the same inflation target 2 percent as for the UK and the EMU countries today) and the actual deviations from the inflation target are pivotal for explaining why Sweden never returned to the low rates of unemployment customary before the economic crisis of the early 
Summary
By its scope and implementation in the wake of a deep recession and in a country and by a party traditionally associated with full employment fiscal austerity was a noteworthy Swedish experiment in the mid-1990s. The tight fiscal policy pursued by the Social Democrat Minister of Finance Göran Persson (Prime Minister from March 1996) was largely based on a cameral concern for budget balance and a political fear of being in the hands of foreign asset holders.
But the restrictive fiscal policy was legitimized by Persson's economic experts in the Ministry of 19 Erixon (2011, pp. 304-305) . The Phillips curves are based on the figures of annual inflation and harmonized unemployment tabulated in OECD Economic Outlook (various issues). The conclusions are similar whether the Swedish estimates are based on a consumer price index (as in the OECD statistics) or on a harmonized index of consumer prices (as in the OECD statistics for the Euro countries and the UK).
Finance, who referred to theories about the neutral or even expansionary effects of fiscal austerity.
This article maintains that fiscal austerity in the mid-1990s was not responsible for the Swedish recovery, neither in the short nor in the long term. On the contrary, notwithstanding a contemporary decline in household savings in alignment with the Ricardian equivalence, the restrictive fiscal policy actually delayed Swedish recovery from the deep crisis of the early 1990s. The reduction in (real) interest rates during the second half of the 1990s primarily reflected expectations about changes in monetary policy unrelated to fiscal policy and an international convergence process. What more is, the encouraging Swedish GDP development from the mid-1990s until the financial crisis was not explained by the tight fiscal policies or the ambitious fiscal rules but primarily by an international upswing and a favourable exchangerate development and industrial composition. The industrial structure explains, inter alia, why
Sweden was boosted by strong positive productivity shocks. Together with fiscal austerity, these factors also contributed to the achievement of a public budget balance already in 1998.
The depressing conclusion for Greece, Spain and Portugal is that Swedish fiscal restraint in the mid-1990s did have contractionary effects and that the specific external, industry-structural and exchange-rate conditions for a similar recovery and rapid budget consolidation (a sustainable international recovery, a strong manufacturing sector and a national currency) simply do not exist in these countries. Besides, budget consolidation was not the main reason for the significant decline in the Swedish net public debt from the mid-1990s.
It shall not be denied that the financial markets might have needed a signal of Swedish fiscal restraint in the mid-1990s. Sweden had recent experiences of high inflation and large public deficits, and the inflation target for the Riksbank was new. But the fiscal policy certainly became too restrictive. Not only did fiscal austerity delay the Swedish recovery after the deep crisis in the early 1990s. Employment cuts through rationalization in municipalities and counties also reduced the quality of the welfare programmes, and led to a deterioration in health status of the female employees in the public sector. In 1998-2002 there was a dramatic increase in the amount and duration of reported sickness among women in the Swedish public sector. Productivity was enhanced at the expense of intensified stress and heavier workloads (Lidwall 2010 ).
The positive lesson from Sweden in the 1990s is that it is possible to establish a consensus about a non-populist economic policy in a democracy, and to accomplish painful fiscal austerity measures even with minority governments. The negative lesson is that the introduction of a 'responsible' fiscal policy in Sweden was based on the uncritical acceptance of new economic thinking, obscuring the obvious conclusion that fiscal austerity has deflationary effects. The Swedish consensus on economic policy in the 1990s was, inter alia, based on an unfounded conviction among decision makers, well-known from the analysis of the psychology of financial markets, that this time is different. An analysis of the effects of Swedish fiscal policy cast doubt over the possibility for the European Commission, leading
European politicians and international lenders, still thinking that this time is different, to lean on Swedish experiences when recommending fiscal austerity measures for the EMU countries currently in crisis.
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